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Adequacy of Government Investigation
The United States urges in its brief that applicants for
intervention did not contend in the District Court that the
Department of Justice's investigation was inadequate.
(United States brief pp. 18, 33). The Points and Author-
ities filed by applicants in support oi' their motion to
intervene, set out in the appendix hereto, urged:
The second criterion [warranting intervention] is
the failure [of] the Attorney General to discharge his
responsibilities . . . to investigate the relevant facts.
The most important factor to be considered in judg-
ing whether literacy tests discriminate on the basis
of raceo1"color is whether there are differencesin the
literacy rates of whites and non-whites,particularly
if they are [due] to unequalor discriminatory public
education. Applicants have alleged just such differ-
ences,inequality and discrimination in their proposed
[answer], but it appears from the affidavit of Mr.
Norman that the United States at 11otime inquired
whether similar facts to thosefound in Gaston. Cownty
might have existed in New York at the time when
today's illiterate non-white adults were children. The
factual investigation vag_lely described in Mr. Nor-
man's affidavit falls far short of the thorough investiga-
tion ill Apache County .... The United States has
declined to make _ meaningful investigation into the
relevant facts .... (Appendix, p. 2ra)
The allegations referred to in the proposed answer con-
cerning illiteracy and unequal education claim discrim-
ination against minori_- children in both the schools of
New York and the schools in southern states from which
many had emigrated. (Pp. 65a-66a) The proposed answer
also urged that non-whites were deterred from seeking to
register. (P. 65a) These are, of course, the very types of
discrimination which prompted Congress to pass the
Cooper Amendment and which applicants urge on appeal.
In their Points and Authorities in support of the Motion
to Alter Judgznent, applicants again renewed their criticism
of the adequacy of the government's investigation.
It is even more apparent from the papers in this
case that the United States has been derelict in its fact
finding responsibility .... It is clear from the record
in this action that the United States, which inquired
with such diligence into literacy rates and educational
discrimination when sued by Gaston County in 1966,
made absolutely 110such inquiry when sued by the
state of New York in 1971. (Pp. 89a-90a)
Applicants' proposed_mswer,together with their Points
and Authorities, gave appellees "fair notice" of the de-
fenses applicants sought to assert and the inadequacies
which they claimed tainted the government'sinvestigation,
C,_nlcy v. GibsoJt, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), and all the al-
legations of applicants' proposed pleading must be deemed
to be true. Ka.:uf,man v. Wolfson, 137 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.
N.Y., 1956). The inadequacy of the Justice Department's
investigation was clearly urged as a ground for interven-
tion in the District Court and can and should be considered
on appeal2
The Untied States maintains that applicants' basic griev-
ance with the Department's investigation and consent to
_Subsequent to the filing of applicants' brief in this Court,
counsel wtls advised by the United States that Justice Department
roeords indie;_ted that govermnent attorneys had met with two of
the applicants in lt172. When investigation by eom,sel for appli-
cants confirmed that this mo.eting had taken phtee, counsel J_or
applicants and the United States agreed upon the following state-
nl(_llt :
"Appellants' counsel recently discovered that -Justi_:e Depart-
ment attorneys met with appellants Stewart and Fortune in
January, 1972 during the course of their investigation; al-
though the Jnstio.e Department attorneys recall informb_g
Stewart and Portmm that this case was pending, neither
Stewart nor Fortune can remember being so informed."
Applicant.s maintain that this meeting did not constitute any
legally relev,_nt notiee, that it did not involve anything which nlight
be characterized as an interview, that it, does not justify the govern-
ment's statements to apl)lieants' counsel in M_lreh and April, 1972,
and tinct it emmot be resorted to at this h_te date to support the
adequacy of the investigation described to tile District Court in
Norman's affidavit of April 3, 1!)72.
The brief of the United States correctly states th,_t Mr. Eric
Schnapper, colmsel for applicants, was not employed by the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund betw,.'en the date on which this action
was filed and l_lareh 9, 1972. United States bri,:f p. 35.
the exemption is that 'they do not agreewith the Attor-
ney General's conclusion about what the public interest
demandsin this case," (United States hrief p. 19), and
that they merely wish to assert "a different theory of the
public interest" (United States brief p. 29). This argu-
ment suggests,for otherwise it is unintelligible, that the
United States consentedto the exemptionbelow because
it thought an exemption was in the public interest. If that
was the basis for the government's position in the District
Court, it was patently erroneous, for section 4 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act gives the Attorney General no such discre-
tion to approve exemptions "in the public interest." The
United States can only consent to an exemption if it knows
of no evidence'of discrhnination in the use of literacy
tests; it cannot disregard such evidence or refuse to look
for it because of its view of the public interest. The Attor-
ney General did urge in 1970 that it would not be in the
public interest to extend section 5 until 1975, but Congress
rejected this view. The United States can no more under-
mine Congress's decision by repealing section 5 piecemeal
through exemptions "in the public interest," than it could
decline to carry out the express mandates of this Court.
Compare Cascode Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co_pany, 376 U.S. 651 (1967).
Applicant's Interest
The United States argues that applicants' pending sec-
tion 5 action does not give them a sufficient interest in the
outcome of tlfis case because it is "merely derivative." The
United States does not explain the legal relevance or sig-
nificance of labeling an action as "derivative" or even
"merely derivative," and Rule 24 draws no distinction be-
tween intervention to protect "merely derivative" legal
interests and intervention to protect other interests. To
describe applicants' section 5 action as derivative is merely
to affirm applicants' claim that they are ,-,titled to inter-
vene as of right becausethey will be boundl)y the result
in this ease.As tile United Statesurgedin Cascade Natural
Gas Corp. v. El, Paso Na.t,ral Gos Co., "The daim to inter-
vention of right is obviously strongest, where the applicant
seeks to protect a property interest or a _;au._¢ of aclion.."
(Brief or' appellee in No. 4, 1966 Term, p. 6t) (]Bml)hasis
added). The thrust af the United States' argument appears
to be that applicants' interest in the oul eome of the ease
is "not different" from that of the Attorney General.
(United States brief, pp. 25-2S). But under Rule 24 an ap-
plicant's interest need not be different from that of the
parties, but only a "direet, substantial, legally proteetable
interest in the proceedings." (United Stah's brief, p. 24
n. 20).
New York's literacy test
New York urges that the differences in literacy rates be-
tween whites and non-whites, and the inferior education
provided .the latter, are irrelevant in this ease beeause
under New York's literacy test. potential voters are ex-
empted from the tests if they had eompleted mort than 6
grades of school. (New York brief, p. 18). This allega-
tion has no bearing on the propriety of interventim b but
should be considered at a hearing .n the merits of the
exemption claim which has yet to be held in this ease. The
record, however, shows that the proportion of non-whites
who had completed less than 5 years ef school was between
Ooo.o and 14.3 times higher than the e.rresponding rate
• _'_ t on.among whites. (Pp. ,_o_- u,,.j. The proportion of children
between 7 and 1.,-3who had dropped out of school has been
higher among non-whites than among whites for half a
eentnry. (P. S0a). Sabstantiall.v mere nen-white than
white children have been more than one grad,; behind in
school. (P. 81a). Tlfis situation is not comparahleto that
in GastonCounty (seeNew York brief p. 18), it is far
worse._
Timelinessof the New York action
Appellees make repeated reference to the fact that ap-
plicants' section 5 action in the Southern District of New
York was filed on the same day as their motion to inter-
vene. Brief of United States 8, 1S, 25, 26; Brief of New
York 14. Neither appellee, however, goes so far as to sug-
gest that the section 5 action was not filed in good faith,
would not have been filed but for the developments in this
case, or would ]lave had a different legal effect if filed
earlier. The undisputed record in this case shows that the
section 5 action dealt with t_vo reapportiomnent laws, one
of which had been enacted only 10 days earlier on March
28, 1972 (P. 58a). Counsel for applicants informed Justice
Department attorneys on March 23 and 29, 1972, that they
intended to file the section 5 action. On April 3, 1972,
counsel was informed by a Justice Department attorney
that the Department had no objection to the institution of
such a section 5 action (Pp. 49a-50a). That action was
commenced 4 days later. In the meantime, however, the
2 The record in this ease demonstrates conclusively the discrimi-
nation in the schools of New York over the last half century which
gave rise to this difference in literacy rates. The literacy tests
would aLso have discriminated on the basis of race eveu if the dif-
ferences in literacy were not the result of stat_ actions. This is
the position taken by the United States during the oral argument
in this Court of G_lston County v. UT_ited States:
Q. I beg your pardon, Mr. Claiborne, but suppose that there
bad been no history of segregation in the public schools.
Suppose that there was just a great many nmre Negro il-
literates for the economic or social reasons that you have
been talking about, would it nonetheless follow that you
could not apply a literacy test?
A. Mr. Justice, I would so argue if it were necessary.
United States took steps which necessarily daomed the
section5 action to which they had no objeeti,n by consent-
ing to the exemption at issue. Apl_li_:ants' right to inter-
vene in this ease should not be eontrallcd l_y the fact that,
in a race to the courthouse of which only the government
was then aware, the United States filed its consent in the
District Court for the District of Columlfia three days be-
fore applicants filed their complaint in the Southern Dis-
trier of New York.
Timeliness of Motion to Intervene
Appellees maintain that the lnetiol_ to intervene was
properly denied because it was not timely as required by
l_.ule 24. United States brief pp. :3t_-32, 41-46; New York
brief pp. 8-12. Applicants urge that appellees must estab-
lish three things to prove that intervention is untimely,
none of whieh has been shown in this ease.
First, those oppc, sing intervention must establish that
intervention e,,uld have been obtained at an earlier date.
In this ease neither New York nor the United States are
prepared to suggest that applicants would or should have
been permitted to intervene prior to April 4, 1972.
Second, those opposing interventiml must establish that
the applicants knew at an earlier date than that on which
intervention was sought that intervention was necessary to
protect their interests. In this case neither New York nor
the United States have urged that applicants or their coun-
sel knew or were even "cm m_tiee" prior tc_ April 4, 1972,
that the United States would consent to an exemption er
that the Department was conducting such an inadequate
investigation as was first revealed on that date.
Applicants urge that where, as ]rare, intervention is
sought because of nonfeasanee by the lLTnited States--its
failure to defend the action and its failure to ,:ondnet an
investigation of the relevant facts--intervention cannot
besoughtuntil that nonfeasanceoccursandbecomespublic
knowledge.As the United Stateshascogentlystated, "The
existenceof an adverse interest can ordinarily be deter-
mined in advanceof trial. Bad faith, collusion or non-
feasancecannot. But theseoccur infrequently, and,where
they arepresent,the proceedingsare sotainted that justice
requires that they not be accorded finality." (Brief of
appelleein Cascade Nat,ural Gas Corp. v. E1 Paso Natural
Gas Co., October 1966 Term, No. 4, 11. 30).
Third, those opposing intervention must establish that
the applicants, by delaying their motion to intervene, had
unreasonably prejudiced the rights of one of the parties.
In this ease appellees urge tlmt the motion was untimely
because, had it been granted in April of 1972, it would have
prevented New York from obtaining an exemption at that
time. Without such an exemption New York would have
had to comply with section 5 before putting its new district
lines in effect in the primary elections then scheduled for
late in June, 1972. This argmnent is unpersuasive for
several reasons.
Any threat of possible prejudice to New York arose not
from the date when intervention was sought, but from
the granting of intervention at any ti,me. The only way
in which New York could have obtained an exemption in
April 1972 was if the United States, as the only defendant,
consented to it. Had applicants been permitted to inter-
vene on December 4, 1972, the day after this action was
commenced, New York would have been prevented from
receiving an exemption on April 13, 1972, as surely as if
applicants' motion of April 7 had been granted. Thus the
injury of which New York complains has nothing whatever
to do with the timeliness of applicants' motion for inter-
vention.
As of April, 1972, New York was undeniably in the
awkward position of wanting to hold primary electionsa
mere two monthslater in new,:listrictswhich had not been
clearedby the Justice Department,alm, blem from which
the state sought to extricate itself I)y obtaining an exemp-
tion from section5. This problem,however,was the result
of a long seriesof unexplaineddelaysby theUnited States
and New York. When the CooperAmendmentbecan,elaw
on June 22,197(I,both appelleesknew that section5 would
apply to the three countiesof New York and that any re-
districting therein would have to be al?provedby the
Justice Department prior to the 1972 1,rimary elections,
then a full two years away. The United States inexplicably
waited nine months to publish in the Federal Register the
required determinations applying section 5 to New York.
New York, in turn, delayed another eight months before
suing for m_ exemption. Even though time was by then
clearly rnnning out, New York agreed to let the United
States take another three months to file its answer in this
ease. Al?pellants' brief p. 37. Similarly. the United States
did not supply New York with corrected 1.970 census data
for its redistricting until October 15, 1.971. New York then
consumed three mnnths enacting the boundaries of 210
assembly and senate districts, and an incomprehensibly
longer five and one half months enacting the boundaries of
39 congressional districts. New York brief p. 10. Thus it
came to pass that in April 1972, eighteen lnonths after the
passage of the Cooper Amendment, New York, with the
consent of the United States, asked the District Court to
exempt it from the Voting Rights Act without the least
semblance of an adversary evidentiary hearing on the
grotmd that such a hearing would um'easonably delay the
proceedings. Applicants should not be penalized for the
unwarranted delays by appellees prior to the motion for
intervention.
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To the difficulties created by appellees'delays in tlfis
casethere was readily availablea solution far lessdrastic
than wholesaleand permanent repeal of section 5's pro-
tections. The Justice Department regulations regarding
section 5 submissionsexpressly provide for accelerated
considerationof suchsubmissionsupon requestunder ap-
propriate circmnstances.36Fed. Reg. 18189-1907In tiffs
case,however,NewYork neversoughtto invokethis special
procedure and the Department never suggestedit do so.
Nor did NewYork exerciseits option to suein the District
Court for the District of Columbia for approval of its
redistricting and ask that court for acceleratedhandling
of sucha case. Acceleratedconsiderationof New York's
reapportionment under section 5, not completeexemption
from that section,was the appropriate remedy for the
problemsNew York faced in early 1972,a remedy which
New York neither e_mustednor evensought.
New York could also have askedthe District Court to
grant the motion to interveneonly on condition that appli-
cantsagree not to press their New York action until after
the completion of the 1972elections. The District Court
has an inherent power to set appropriate conditions in
granting or denying motions under the Federal Rules of
3 §51.22 Expeditedconsideration.
When a submittingauthority demonstratesgoodcausefor
specialexpeditedconsiderationto perndtenforcementof a change
affectingvoting witbin the 60-dayperiod_ollowingsubmission(goodcausewill, in general,onlybefoundto existwith respecto
cbangesmadenecessaryby circumstancesbeyondthe controlof
theenactingor submittingautborities),theAttorneyGeneralmay
considerthe submissiononan expeditedbasis.Promptnoticeof
therequestfor expeditedconsiderationwill begivento interested
partiesregisteredin accordancewith§51.13.Whenadecisionot
to objectis madewithin the60-dayperiodfo]lowb_greceiptof a
submissionwhichsatisfiestherequirementsof §51.10(a),theAt-
torneyGeneralmayreexaminethesubmissionif additionalinforma-
tion comesto his attentiondurfilg the remainderof tim 60-day
periodwhichwouldrequireobjectionin accordancewith §51.19.
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Civil Procedure. CompareDi_icl_ v. Schcdt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935); 6 h,[oore's Federal Practice [[59.05[3]. If New
York were correct in its contention that unconditional in-
tervention would have reasonably prejudiced its interests,
the imposition of such a couditi,_u would have constituted
ample protection for the state.
Both New Yurk and the United States urge that ap-
plicants should have sought intervention prior to April
7, 1972, in the light of an article in the New I_or],: Times
on February 6, 1972 (p. 48, col. 3, United States Brief
p. 42, New York Brief pp. 8-9). New York further asserts,
for the first time in this case, tlmt the Americal_ Civil
Liberties Union had requested a copy of the complaint
after this article appeared but declined to intervene "after
studying the papers." (New York brief, p. 9).
The New Yorl_ Ti_tcs article and _l letter from the Civil
Liberties Union d_-tailing its activities regarding this case
are set out in the appendix hereto. The letter from the
Civil Liberties Union states they concluded that interven-
tion would be premature in February 1972 since the Jus-
tice Department had not yet determined its position. Al-
though the state Attorney General's office was aware of
their interest and had informed them that the Justice
Department had yet to determine its position, that office
did not inform the Civil Liberties Union when Justice did
take a position or when judgment was entered in favor of
New York. (Pp. 6ra-7ra). The Civil Liberties Union
is not a party to this action, and any actual notice to them
is not binding upon applicants.
The Times article does not state that the United States
had consented to the exemption or had concluded there
was no evidence of discrimination. Nor does the article
suggest that the United States was conducting any investi-
gation or was considering agreeing to the exemption.
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After reporting an announcementon February 5, ]972 by
the Attorney General that he had filed this action, the
action having actually beencommenced2 months earlier,
the article quotes several public officials and others as
assertingthis action had been"quietly filed" to "cover up
voter discrimination." (P. 5ra). One of the state's critics
was quoted as contendiug the literacy tests ]lad been ap-
plied discriminatory, and "that people in black and Puerto
Rican areas had been deterred from registering by various
means, including a lack of Spanish-speaking inspectors"
(P. 4ra). Two months after this article appeared the
Justice Department filed an affidavit stating its investiga-
tion revealed "no allegation" of discrimination in the use
of literacy tests. (P. 41a). The article quoted the Attor-
ney General as stating he had sued in open court rather
than using "an alternative procedure to ask the United
States Attorney General for exemption." (P. 5ra). No
such alternative procedure exists under the Voting Rights
Act. The state Attorney General is further quoted as ex-
plaining that he had chosen not to invoke this non-existent
alternative in order to avoid "charges of political influence."
In the face of Attorney General Katzenbach's testimony
tlmt intervention in exemption cases would be possible even
under the restrictive pre-1966 version of R.ule 24, the
United States properly concedes that intervention in such
cases is not precluded by section 4(a). United States brief,
pp. 15 n. 13, 17, 21. The government, however, proceeds
in the remainder of its brief to set standards for interven-
tion which can never be met. The United States first makes
it clear that no person could ever have the requisite interest
to justify the intervention. The government concludes that
neither protection of a section 5 action or retention of the
benefits of coverage by the Act gives an applicant the
needed type of interest in the outcome of an exemption
13
proceeding,and doesnot suggestany other interest which
might suffice.Further the United Statesurgesthat neither
its refusal to defend this action nor its failure to investi-
gate the relevant /'acts constitute inadequate representa-
tion. By this standard the Attorney General could con-
sent without investigation to exempt for each of the south-
crn states covered by the 1965 Act without "hmdequately
represeuting" the black citizens affected. Similarly, while
urging that intervention after the government's default is
too late, the United States has not clearly relinquished
its position in Cascade Natural Gas, supra, p. 8, that
intervention before s_ch non-feasance would be too early.
If, as Attorney General Katzenbach testified, intervention
is at times proper in section 4 cases, their there must be
some conceivable person who has a sufficient interest in
the case, some conceivable conduct which would constitute
inadequate represe, ntation, and some time to seek interven-
tion which is neither too early nor too late.
This case does not inw3lve, as the United States has
objected in other litigation, an attempt by applicants to
"wrest control of the litigation" from the govermnent.
Compare Brief of Appellee in Casvade Nat._ral Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. 4, October 1966 Term
p. 31. The United States has adopted a position of neu-
trality on the merits of this case; the govermnent has indi-
cated on the one hand that it would not oppose judgment
granting the exemption, and it has not indicated it would
support such an exemption. 4 The United States in the
District Court did not object to applicants assuming con-
trol of the defense of this ease. On appeal the United States
is willing to defend the decision of the District Court, but
• 4 In its brief in Apache: Cownty v. United Slates, D.D.C. No.
292-66, p. 10, n. 5. the United States not nnly consented to an ex-
emption and opposed intervontion, but stated that if intervention
were granted it would support plaintiff's claims on the merits.
14
the governmentdoesnot go sofar asto urge it wouldhave
been reversible error for the District Court to have per-
mitted intervention. Under thesecircumstancesapplicants
maintain that any presumptionagainst intervention on the
side of the United States suggestedin Cascade, A_acl_e
Co.wnty, or Trbovi¢:lt, in all of which the government opposed
intervention at the district court level, are inapplicable to
this case.
Having earlier urged, as in Cascade Nat_ral Gas Corfl.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., that the courts in intervention
cases should presume that the United States is fulfilling
its responsibilities and trust that it is adequately represent-
ing affected members of the public, the govcrmnent now
advocates the contrary attitude for those private parties
whose interests are involved. A private party nmst not
presume or trust that the United States will inform him
of litigation vital to his interests ; rather, he must scrutinize
daily the pages of all the newpapers in his area lest, as
here, the government hold him "on notice" because of a
brief article appearing on page _9 in only one of several
papers on a single day. Compare United States brief pp.
10, 42, 46. Tf a private party learns of such litigation, he
must not presume or trust that the United States will de-
fend his interests. On the contrary, he nmst assume that
his government will be guilty of collusion or nonfeasance
and seek to intervene at once; if he puts his faith in the
Department of Justice until and unless he has substantial
reason to doubt the adequacy of their representation, be
will be accused of "sitting by" and "doing nothing." United
States brief, pp. 19, 42, 46. And if such a citizen or
organization learns that the United States is conducting
an investigation, they are not to assume the vast resources
of the federal govermnent will uncover relevant evidence,
even evidence so readily obtainable as census reports (see
15
pp. 79a-S7a),publishedcourt decisions(seepp. 78a-79a)or
law review articles (seep. 82a), nor can they presmnethat
theUnited Stateswill rememberlegal theoriesadvancedby
it a year or two earlier (see.,kppellants'brief, pp. 30-36).
Such parties must, simultaneouswith tile government's
investigation, conducttheir own investigation and present
the results to the Justice Department or else be precluded
from presenting evidence as intervenors. United States
brief pp. 10, 19, 34, .3(;, '42, 46¢ We submit that interested
parties, no less than the courts, arc entitled to assume until
shown otherwise that the United States is adequately repre-
senting hoth interested parties and the general public.
The United States takes great umbrage at applicants'
allegations that its investigation was seriously inadequate
and its consent erroneous, United States brief, pp. 18, 28,
32, 35, and characterizes al)l_licants' contentions as "serious
accusations". (United States brief, p. 30). But applicants
did not seek to intervene, and have nc_t pursued this appeal,
to east aspersions on anyone. Applicants recognize the
salutory role the Department of Justice has played in pro-
teeting the civil rights of minority groups over many years
and under several presidents. Bat the Department of
Justice can be wrong. We submit that that is the case
here. Applicants ask tufty that this Court reverse the judg-
ment of the District Court and permit them to defend this
action at a hearing on the merits.
S Attorney General Katzenbaeh, by contrast, llrged only that
private parties bring evidence to the Attorney General if and after
intervention were denied. United States brief p. 44, n. 44. New
York and apparently the United Statos appear to question whether
applicants ever "had any" evidence of discrimination. New York
brief, p. 18, United States brief, p. 42. Applicants submit that the
evidence in the record and presented to the District Court, includ-
ing census dala, court decisions, and severnl extensive studies of
New York public schools is far more detailed and persuasive than
that found sufficient to defeat an exemption in Gaston Co u.Mg v.
U_ited States.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the judgment below should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
J_OK G_EE_BE_O
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Points and Authorities
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUI_IBIA
Civil Action No. Cir. 2419-71
NEW YORI,: STATE, on behalf of New York, Bronx
and Kings Counties,
Plaintiff,
iagainst--
UNITED STATES OF AI_IERICA_
Def e_da,n.t,
N.A.A.C.P., etc., et al.,
Applicants for Interve_dion.
The only previous case in which a private party sought
to intervene to prevent a state or subdivision from winning
exemption from the Voting Rights Act under section 4
thereof is Apacl_e Cownty v. United States, 256 F. Supp.
903 (D.D.C. 1966).
The Court in Apache County set out two criterion the
meeting of either of which would wararnt such interven-
tion. The first criterion was the pendency of an action by
the applicants to enforce their individual or private rights,
such as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on which the section 4
action would be legally binding. Such an action is now
pending in the United States District Court for the South-
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ern District of New York, N.A.A.C.P., etc., et al. v. New
York City Board of Elections.
The second criterion is the failure to the Attorney Gen-
eral to discharge his responsibilities to protect the public
interest and to investigate the relevant facts. The most
important factor to be considered in judging whether
literacy tests discriminate on the hasis of race or color is
whether there are differences in the literacy rates of whites
and non-whites, particularly if they are do to unequal
discriminatory public education. Gasto_t Cou_lty v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). Applicants have alleged just
such differences, ine,.luality and discrimination in their pro-
posed complaint,* but it appears from the affidavit of h'[r.
Norman that the United States at no time inquired whether
similar facts to those found in Gasto_. Couq_ty might have
existed in New York tat the time when today's illiterate
non-white adults were children. The factual investigation
vaguely described in Mr. Norman's affidavit falls far short
of the thorough investigation in Apache County of possible
discriminatory applications of literacy tests, and the actual
investigations held in this case never included a request
for information from applicants, whom the United States
knew to be vitally interested in this matter.
This Court is required under the Voting Rights Act to
make a determination of fact that New York has not within
the last 10 years used any test or device with the purpose
or the effect of denying the right to vote on account of
race or color. The United States has declined to make a
meaningful investigation into the relevant facts and will
not present to this Court any information regarding such
usages. Applicants for intervention should be permitted to
* This is a typographical error. The accompanying proposed
pleading was technically an answer not a complaint, and it was
so labeled.
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intervene and to offer evidence of such usages to this Court
so that it can properly discharge its statutory duties.
JACK GREENBERG
ERIC SC]_[NAPPER
JEFFRY l_'_IqTZ
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, N. Y.
212-586-8397
Attorneys for applica,nts
ra 4
Extract From New York Times Dated February 6, 1972
THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, FERBUARY 6, 1.972
LEFKOWITZ ACTS TO BAR VOTIN(_ WATCH
State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz said yester-
day that he had moved in Federal Court in Washington to
have the state exempted from potential Federal supervision
over registration and voting in Manhattan, the Bronx and
Brooklyn.
Mr. Lefkowitz said he had acted in line with procedures
of the Voting Rights Act of 1970, and asserted that the
exemption was needed to let the state go ahead with legis-
lative and Congressional reapportionment laws and any
other changes involving voting rights.
Disc rbnination Seen,
The state's suit was attacked in a statement yesterday
by the Rev. H. Carl McCall, chairman of the Citizens Voter
Education Committee; Representative Herumn Badillo and
Borough Presidents Percy E. Sutton of Manhattan and
Robert Abrams of the Bronx.
The four critics declared Federal intervention was needed
to end what they called "gross and systematic discrimina-
tion in New York."
The 1970 law provides Federal superxdsion of voting
procedures in any county in a state if fewer than 50 per
cent of eligibles voted in the 1968 Presidential election.
Such requirements have led to use of Federal registrars
in the South.
_'[r. _'[eCall contended that the former literacy tests had
been "applied discriminatorily" here and that people in
black and Puerto Rican areas had been deterred from reg-
istering by various means, including a lack of Spanish-
speaking inspectors.
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The four critics declared that the state petition for ex-
emption had been "quietly filed" in what they called an
attempt by the State Attorney General to "cover up voter
discrimination."
Mr. Lefkowitz said the four "owe me a public apology."
He said the suit had been filed in open court instead of an
alternative procedure to ask the United States Attorney
General for exemption, which he said might have led to
charges of political influence.
He said that he was "ready to show that our literacy
test was not used for the purpose of abridging anyone's
right to w)te for race or color" and that leaders in the city
had nmde special efforts, including extra registration peri-
ods and places, to bring out prospective voters.
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Letter From New York Civil Liberties Union
Dated January 26, 1973
NYCLU
New York Civil Liberties Union, 84 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10011. Telepbone 924-7800
Burr Neuborne,
Staff Counsel
January 26, 1973
Dear Mr. Schnapper :
I have received your letter dated January 19, 1973, in
which you request information concerning the American
Civil Liberties Union's receipt of a copy of the amended
complaint in NAACP v. New York.
Shortly after the appearance of a story in the New York
Times in February 1972, describing the filing of a suit by
New York State to remove itself from the pre-clearance
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, I telephoned Mr.
George Zuckerman to request a copy of New York's com-
plaint and the Justice Department's answering papers.
h_r. Zuckerman immediately forwarded a copy of New
York's amended complaint to me and informed me that
the Justice Department had requested a len_hy adjourn-
ment to consider its position. Since the Justice Depart-
merit had not yet determined its position in the matter,
we deemed consideration of intervention premature.
Eric Schnapper, Esq.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
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Dated January 26, 1973
I heard nothing further concerning the matter, either
from New York State or in the press, until May 1972,
when the New York State Attorney General's office pro-
duced a copy of the unreported consent degree in NAACP
v. New York, in response to my argument in Socialist
Labor Party v. Rockefeller, 72 Civ. 2049 that certain modi-
fications in the New York State Election Law had been
enacted in violation of the pre-clearance requirements of
the Voting Rights Act.
My office had no notice that tile Justice Department con-
sented to the entry of judgment in NAACP v. New I;ork.
Sincerely yours,
C(3 : GEORGE ZUCKERi%_AI'q
/s/ BVE_ N_U_ORNE
Burr Neuborne
